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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Christopher T. Dean appeals from the district court’s intermediate 
appellate decision that affirmed his conviction for second degree stalking.  On 
appeal, Dean argues the district court erred by affirming the magistrate’s order 
denying his motion to dismiss and by finding the evidence presented at trial 
sufficient to sustain the magistrate’s finding of guilt. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In October 2010, Natasha Mullins and her toddler son began living in an 
apartment above Dean’s garage.  (R., p.69; Tr.1, p.17, L.22 – p.21, L.6.)  Ms. 
Mullins rented the apartment from Dean and his wife.  (R., p.69; Tr., p.20, Ls.9-
15.)  The written lease agreement indicated the rental property was a “1 
bedroom/1 bathroom over garage (upstairs) apartment.”  (R., p.69; State’s 
Exhibit 1.)  However, with the Deans’ knowledge and consent, Ms. Mullins also 
had access to and used a second bathroom (the “front bathroom”) and a laundry 
room, both of which were adjacent to her apartment above the garage but which 
were not included as part of the rental property in the written lease agreement.  
(R., pp.69-70, 72; Tr., p.24, L.19 – p.26, L.13.)  Ms. Mullins also later “converted 
what had been Ms. Dean’s office” – which was also above the Deans’ garage – 
“into a bedroom for her son.”  (R., pp.69-70; Tr., p.24, Ls.6-18.) 
                                            
1 All references herein to “Tr.” are to the transcript entitled “June 24, 2013 Trial,” 
which was augmented into the appellate record by order of the Idaho Supreme 
Court.  (See 5/25/16 Order granting state’s motion to augment.) 
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 In the summer of 2011, while Ms. Mullins was still residing in the 
apartment above the Deans’ garage, Dean and his wife went out of town for an 
extended period.  (R., p.70; Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27, L.4.)  Dean returned home, 
without his wife, on August 6, 2011.  (R., pp.70-71; Tr., p.27, Ls.5-9.)  That same 
evening, Ms. Mullins returned to her apartment after having been out and 
discovered that some of her clothing, which she had left near the sink in the front 
bathroom, had been disturbed.  (R., pp.70-71; Tr., p.27, L.22 – p.28, L.3, p.55, 
L.3 – p.56, L.6; Defendant’s Exhibit A.)  Ms. Mullins noticed that the same thing 
happened every day over the next several days, explaining: “Somebody was 
entering my apartment and messing with my clothes.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.2-3.) 
 On August 12, 2011, while Dean’s wife was still out of town, Ms. Mullins 
and Dean attended a concert together.  (R., p.70; Tr., p.63, L.18 – p.66, L.12.)  
On the drive home, Dean made a pass at Ms. Mullins.  (R., p.70; Tr., p.65, L.19 
– p.67, L.6.)  He told her he wanted to get a drink and “said maybe I’ll get you 
drunk enough to get you into bed.”  (Tr., p.66, L.21 – p.67, L.6.)  Ms. Mullins 
declined Dean’s advances and went home and locked her doors.  (Tr., p.67, 
Ls.7-17.)  The next day Ms. Mullins began to suspect it was Dean who had been 
entering her apartment and tampering with her clothes.  (Tr., p.84, Ls.11-20.) 
 Beginning on August 14 and continuing through August 16, 2011, Ms. 
Mullins took photographs to document the location and position of her clothing 
each time she left and returned to her apartment.  (Tr., p.29, L.19 – p.30, L.8, 
p.31, L.3 – p.34, L.3; State’s Exhibits 2-16; Defendant’s Exhibits F-G.)  The items 
of clothing Ms. Mullins photographed were located variously throughout the 
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property Ms. Mullins rented and/or used with the Deans’ consent, including in the 
front bathroom, the laundry room, and in Ms. Mullins’ bedroom closet.  (Tr., p.31, 
L.19 – p.32, L.6.)  On each occasion she returned home, Ms. Mullins discovered 
the items of clothing she had photographed, which always included her 
undergarments, had been disturbed.  (R., p.71; Tr., p.33, L.7 – p.34, L.3.) 
 On August 15, 2011, in addition to photographing her clothing, Ms. Mullins 
set up two hidden video cameras, one under the vanity in the front bathroom and 
one in her kitchen cabinets.  (Tr., p.34, L.25 – p.37, L.23, p.39, L.19 – p.40, 
L.15.)  Ms. Mullins activated the camera in the front bathroom before she left the 
apartment in the morning.  (Tr., p.37, L.9 – p.38, L.1, p.75, L.21 – p.76, L.1.)  
The resulting video recording, taken while Ms. Mullins was away, shows the legs 
of an individual wearing tennis shoes that Ms. Mullins identified as belonging to 
Dean walking into the bathroom and past the hidden camera.  (State’s Exhibit 
17; Tr., p.38, Ls.8-25.)  While out of view of the camera, the individual twice 
makes what appear to be long sniffing sounds.  (State’s Exhibit 17.)  The 
individual then walks back in front of the camera and out of the bathroom.  
(State’s Exhibit 17.)  A second video, which was taken from the vantage point of 
Ms. Mullins’ kitchen cabinets while she was out of the apartment later in the day 
on August 15, shows Dean entering Ms. Mullins’ apartment, stopping first in the 
front bathroom, then walking into the kitchen and past the camera toward the 
area of Ms. Mullins’ bedroom.  (State’s Exhibit 18; R., p.70; Tr., p.39, L.19 – 
p.42, L.3, p.84, L.23 – p.86, L.6.)  Approximately 90 seconds later, Dean walks 
back into the view of the camera in the kitchen, looks around, and then walks out 
 
 4 
of the kitchen and into the hallway where he bends down, picks up an item of 
clothing from what Ms. Mullins identified was a laundry basket, and presses the 
clothing to his face.  (State’s Exhibit 18; R., p.70, Tr., p.42, Ls.18-20, p.86, L.13 – 
p.87, L.4.) 
 The state charged Dean by Uniform Citation with two counts of second 
degree stalking, both of which were alleged to have been committed on August 
15, 2011.  (R., p.8.)  More than a year later, after both a speedy trial waiver (see 
R., pp.1-2) and what was apparently a failed mediation attempt (see R., pp.2, 17-
21), Dean filed a motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice (R., pp.22-25), 
asserting as the basis for the motion that “the citation in this case is facially 
deficient, and the statute of limitations for any conduct alleged to have violated a 
misdemeanor statute is past [sic]” (R., p.24).   
 Before the magistrate ruled on Dean’s motion to dismiss, the state sought 
and was granted leave to file an “Amended Complaint” charging Dean with one 
count of second degree stalking and one count of unlawful entry.  (R., pp.32-34.)  
Dean thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing the second degree 
stalking charge was not supported by probable cause, and the unlawful entry 
charge was barred by the statute of limitations and also failed as a matter of law.  
(R., pp.37-39; see also R., pp.48-50, 53-56.)  After a hearing and briefing, the 
magistrate denied Dean’s motions to dismiss the second degree stalking charge 
but granted his motion to dismiss the unlawful entry charge on statute of 
limitations grounds.  (R., pp.48-50, 53-56.)  
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 Consistent with the magistrate’s ruling, the state filed a “Second Amended 
Complaint” charging Dean with a single count of second degree stalking.  (R., 
pp.63-64.)  Dean proceeded to a court trial (R., pp.65-67), after which the 
magistrate entered written findings and conclusions of law finding Dean guilty of 
second degree stalking (R., pp.68-77).  Dean thereafter filed a “Motion For 
Reconsideration, Renewed Motion For Acquittal; And Dismissal Of Charges” (R., 
pp.78-84), which the magistrate denied (R., pp.85-92).  The magistrate entered 
judgment and placed Dean on probation.  (R., pp.93-94.)  Dean timely appealed 
to the district court (R., pp.95-99), which affirmed (R., pp.115-19).  Dean timely 





Dean states the issues on appeal as: 
 
 1. Did the lower courts err in not dismissing the sole 
remaining count because of the facial deficiency of the citation and 
the statute of limitations? 
 
 2. Did the lower courts err in not acquitting the 
Defendant because 1) the State failed to show the requisite intent 
of malice, 2) the lower courts erred in its [sic] definition of malice, 
and 3) the trial court fail [sic] to apply cannons of statutory 
construction and the Rule of Lenity in this case to a vaguely worded 
statute? 
 
 3. Did the trial court fail to have sufficient substantial 
and credible evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Dean failed to show the district court erred by affirming the 
magistrate’s orders denying Dean’s motions to dismiss the second degree 
stalking charge? 
 
2. According to the court minutes, five witnesses (four state’s witnesses and 
one defense witness) testified at Dean’s trial for second degree stalking.  On 
appeal to the district court, Dean provided a partial trial transcript, containing the 
testimony of only two of the five witnesses who testified at trial.  Because missing 
portions of the record are presumed to support the trial court’s rulings, must this 
Court affirm the district court’s appellate determination that the state presented 
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that Dean was guilty of 






The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Affirming The 
Magistrate’s Orders Denying Dean’s Motions To Dismiss 
 
A. Introduction 
 The Uniform Citation, filed on August 22, 2011, charged Dean with having 
committed two counts of second degree stalking in violation of Idaho Code 
Section “18-7906(c)(4).”  (R., p.8.)  More than a year later, Dean filed a motion to 
dismiss the charges on the basis that the citation cited a non-existent subsection 
of I.C. § 18-7906 and, therefore, failed to allege a crime.  (R., pp.22-25.)  Dean 
also argued that, because the Uniform Citation did not charge a crime, any 
attempt by the state to amend the charging document would necessarily 
constitute the charging of a new offense outside the one-year statute of limitation 
for misdemeanor prosecutions.  (Id.) 
 Before the magistrate ruled on Dean’s motion, the state sought and was 
granted leave to file an amended complaint.  (R., p.32.)  Relevant to this appeal, 
the Amended Complaint charged Dean with one count of second degree 
stalking, in violation of “I.C. [§] 18-7906,” for having  
knowingly and maliciously engage[d] in a course of conduct that 
seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed the victim and is such as 
would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, 
to-wit, repeatedly and without her consent, entered onto property 
leased or occupied by the victim. 
 
(R., pp.33-34.)  Dean filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing in relevant part 
that the stalking charge was not supported by probable cause.  (R., pp.37-39.) 
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 After a hearing, the magistrate denied Dean’s motions to dismiss as they 
related to second degree stalking, ruling (1) the citation to a non-existent 
subsection of I.C. § 18-7906 in the original charging document was merely a 
clerical error; (2) the filing of the amended complaint charging second degree 
stalking in violation of I.C. § 18-7906 without reference to any particular 
subsection of that statute was simply a correction of the original clerical error and 
did not charge a new crime; and (3) the charge was supported by probable 
cause.  (R., pp.46-57.)  The district court affirmed the magistrate’s rulings on 
intermediate appeal.  (R., pp.116-17.) 
 Dean challenges the lower courts’ rulings, arguing as he did below that 
the Uniform Citation did not charge a crime and that the second degree stalking 
charge alleged in the Amended Complaint was a new charge, which was barred 
by the one-year statute of limitation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-20.)  Dean’s 
arguments fail.  A review of the record and of the applicable law supports the 
magistrate’s determination that the citation and the amended complaint both 
charged second degree stalking and, therefore, the amended charge was not 
time-barred.  The district court correctly affirmed the magistrate’s orders denying 
Dean’s motions to dismiss. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
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appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
“If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.”  Id. (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)). 
A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Daniels, 134 Idaho 896, 898, 11 P.3d 1114, 1116 (2000).   
The applicability of a statute of limitations to an action under a given set of facts 
is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review.  State 
v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). 
 
C. The Second Degree Stalking Charge Alleged In The Amended Complaint 
Was Not A New Or Different Offense Than Alleged In The Uniform 
Citation And, Therefore, Was Not Barred By The Statute Of Limitation 
 
 As a general rule, a prosecution for any misdemeanor must be 
commenced by the filing of a complaint within one year of its commission.  I.C. § 
19-403(1).  “The complaint in a uniform citation may be used as the complaint to 
prosecute a misdemeanor ….”  I.M.C.R. 3(b).  Regardless whether the state 
initially charges the misdemeanor by complaint or by uniform citation, “[t]he court 
may amend or permit to be amended any process or pleading at any time before 
the prosecution rests including the alleging of a lesser included offense, but no 
greater or different offense may be charged if substantial rights of the defendant 
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are prejudiced.”  I.M.C.R. 3(d); compare I.C. § 19-1420 (“An information or 
indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense other than that for 
which the defendant has been held to answer”). 
 In this case, the state charged Dean by Uniform Citation with two counts 
of second degree stalking, both of which were alleged to have been committed 
on August 15, 2011, in violation of I.C. § “18-7906(c)(4).”  (R., p.8.)  The citation 
was filed on August 22, 2011, well within the one-year limitation period for 
misdemeanor prosecutions.  (R., p.8.)  More than a year later, after Dean moved 
to dismiss the charges (see R., pp.22-25), the magistrate permitted the state to 
file an Amended Complaint which, relevant to this appeal, again charged Dean 
with having committed the misdemeanor offense of second degree stalking, in 
violation of I.C. § “18-7906” (R., pp.32-34.)  Because even a cursory review of 
the citation and the Amended Complaint shows they charged the same offense – 
second degree stalking – the second degree stalking charge alleged in the 
Amended Complaint was merely a continuation of the prosecution initiated by 
the filing of the Uniform Citation and, as such, was not time-barred. 
 Dean argues otherwise.  Specifically, he contends the uniform citation did 
not charge a crime at all and, therefore, the second degree stalking charge 
alleged in the Amended Complaint was necessarily a “different and distinct 
offense” for which the statute of limitation had already run.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.18-20.)  According to Dean, “the uniform citation failed to adequately inform 
the Defendant of the nature of the crime against him, and never charged a crime 
at all” because it did not allege Dean “‘engage[d] in a course of conduct’ i.e. 
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repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim,” which is a 
“necessary element” of second degree stalking under I.C. § 18-7906.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.19-20 (emphasis original).)  Dean argues this “obvious 
deficienc[y],” combined with the reference in the citation to a non-existent 
subsection of I.C. § 18-7906, were fatal defects in the citation and, consequently, 
“no crime was ever alleged against the Defendant until the ‘amended complaint’ 
was filed” in September 2012, at which “time the statute of limitations had run 
and the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
p.20.)  Dean’s arguments are without merit.  
 A charging document is legally sufficient if it satisfies two requirements:  
“‘it must impart jurisdiction’” and it must “‘satisfy due process.’”  State v. 
Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016) (quoting State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 695, 708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009)).  A charging 
document confers jurisdiction when it alleges the defendant committed a criminal 
offense in the State of Idaho. Severson, 147 Idaho at 708, 215 P.3d at 428; 
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004); State v. Olin, 
153 Idaho 891, 893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012).  To satisfy due process, 
a charging document must ordinarily be specific enough to ensure that the 
defendant has a meaningful opportunity to prepare his defense.  Severson, 147 
Idaho at 709, 215 P.3d at 429 (citations omitted).  In the case of a uniform 
citation, however, such specificity is not required.  The misdemeanor criminal 
rules provide not only that “[t]he complaint in a uniform citation may be used as 
the complaint to prosecute a misdemeanor,” I.M.C.R. 3(b), but also that “a trial 
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may be held on the complaint contained in the citation without making a sworn 
complaint, unless a sworn complain is demanded by any party within 28 days 
after the entry of a plea of not guilty or 7 days before trial, whichever is earlier,” 
I.M.C.R. 3(d).  As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, “a uniform citation 
provides a simplified way of charging misdemeanors and infractions and 
resolving the resulting cases expeditiously.”  State v. Cahoon, 116 Idaho 399, 
401, 775 P.2d 1241, 1243 (1989).  Thus, in the absence of a demand for a 
sworn complaint, a uniform citation satisfies due process notice requirements if it 
contains a brief description of the offense, the applicable code section, and the 
date and time it was alleged to have been committed.  See id. at 400-01, 775 
P.2d at 1242-43 (holding citation sufficient to satisfy notice requirements and 
charge an offense where it was inscribed with “the date, time, the words 
‘resisting, obstructing and delaying an officer’ and the number of the applicable 
code section”). 
 Application of the above legal principles to the Uniform Citation filed by 
the state in this case shows the citation was legally sufficient to charge Dean 
with two counts of second degree stalking.  The citation alleged that, on August 
15, 2011 at 1800 o’clock p.m.,” Dean committed two counts of “Stalking 2nd 
Degree,” in violation of I.C. § “18-7906(c)(4).”  (R., p.8.)  Although Dean correctly 
notes I.C. § 18-7906 does not contain a subsection “(c)(4),” the reference in the 
citation to that non-existent subsection was not a jurisdictional defect and did not 
deprive Dean of notice of the nature of the crime.  See I.C.R. 7(b) (a charging 
document should contain an “official or customary” citation to the statute 
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violated, but any error in the citation is not grounds for dismissal unless it misled 
the defendant to his prejudice); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 222, 16 P.3d 890, 
898 (2001) (same).  As found by both the magistrate and district courts, the 
citation clearly alleged Dean committed the offense of stalking in the second 
degree, in violation of I.C. § 18-7906.  (R., pp.49-50, 53-54, 116.)  The 
extraneous citation to subsection “(c)(4),” while incorrect, was not misleading, as 
even Dean recognized in his motion to dismiss that the officer who wrote the 
citation may have intended to cite subsection “(2)(c)(iv)” of I.C. § 18-7906 and 
thereby allege that Dean violated the stalking statute by “enter[ing] onto or 
remain[ing] on property owned, leased or occupied by the victim.”  (R., p.23 
(citing I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(iv)).)  And, ultimately, that is precisely the conduct 
that formed the basis of the second degree stalking charge alleged in the 
Amended Complaint.  (See R., pp.33-34, 63-64.)   Because the record shows 
Dean was actually on notice of the nature of the charges against him, his claim 
that the Uniform Citation failed to sufficiently provide him with such notice and, 
therefore, failed to charge a crime at all, necessarily fails.2 
 Dean’s argument that the second degree stalking charge alleged in the 
Amended Complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations rests entirely on 
his claim that the Uniform Citation was not sufficiently specific enough to charge 
                                            
2 Even if the Uniform Citation did not adequately apprise Dean of the nature of 
the charged offenses, Dean’s remedy would have been to demand a sworn 
complaint within 28 days after the entry of his not guilty plea.  I.M.C.R. 3(b); 
Cahoon, 116 Idaho at 401, 775 P.2d at 1243.  Because Dean did not even 
attempt to avail himself of that remedy, his motion to dismiss the citation on the 
alleged basis that it failed to provide him with adequate notice of the charged 




an offense.  For the reasons stated above, however, the Uniform Citation fairly 
charged Dean with second degree stalking.  Because the citation charging 
second degree stalking was filed well within the one-year limitation period for 
misdemeanor prosecutions, and because the second degree stalking charge 
alleged in the Amended Complaint was not a new or distinct offense, the district 




Dean Failed To Provide The District Court With An Adequate Record For 
Appellate Review Of His Sufficiency Of The Evidence Claims 
 
 Dean challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his second 
degree stalking conviction, arguing the state failed to prove he acted with malice 
and otherwise failed to prove the remaining elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-43.)  Dean’s challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence fail, however, because he failed to provide the district 
court (and, consequently, this Court) with a complete trial transcript and, 
therefore, failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review of his claims. 
It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a sufficient 
record on appeal to substantiate his or her appellate claims.  State v. Beason, 
119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 
Idaho 447, 449, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. 1985).  “In the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the appellate 
court] will not presume error.”  State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 P.3d 
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794, 797 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011).  
To the contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 
actions of the court below.  State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 
1352 (Ct. App. 1992).   
According to the minutes, five witnesses (four state’s witnesses and one 
defense witness) testified at Dean’s June 24, 2013 court trial.  (R., pp.65-67.)  
On appeal to the district court, Dean provided only a partial trial transcript, 
containing the testimony of just two of the five witnesses who testified at that 
proceeding.  (Compare R., p.110 (10/14/14 order directing “transcript of the trial 
prepared by David Marlow [to be] filed with” district court clerk) with 6/14/13 Tr. 
(partial trial transcript, filed with district court on 10/29/14); see also R., p.121, 
¶2.(g) (representing in Notice of Appeal from district court’s appellate decision 
that “[a] transcript has been made of relevant testimony” (emphasis added)).)  
That partial trial transcript, which has also been provided to this Court on appeal, 
is wholly inadequate for appellate review of Dean’s sufficiency of the evidence 
claims because such review necessarily requires an examination of all of the 
evidence presented at trial to determine whether there was substantial evidence 
upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 
603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997);  State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 
1987).  In the absence of a complete trial transcript, this Court must presume the 
magistrate’s finding of guilt was supported by substantial, competent evidence, 
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and the district court’s appellate decision must be affirmed on that basis.3  See, 
e.g., Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 174, 158 P.3d 947, 
950 (2007) (presuming evidence supported lower court’s decision where 





 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
intermediate appellate decision that affirmed Dean’s conviction for second 
degree stalking. 
 DATED this 30th day of August, 2016. 
 
       
  /s/ Lori A. Fleming_________________ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 





                                            
3 In the event this Court reaches the merits of Dean’s sufficiency of the evidence 
claims despite his failure to have provided a complete trial transcript, the state 
submits the evidence was sufficient for the reasons articulated by the magistrate 
both in its written “Findings” (R., pp.68-77) and in its “Decision And Order Re: 
Motion To Reconsider” (R., pp.85-91), as well as by the district court in its 
“Decision And Order Re: Appeal” (R., pp.115-18), all of which the state adopts as 
its argument on appeal. 
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